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 Nutrient Water Quality Trading: A Market-
Based Solution to Water Pollution in the 
Natural State* 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
In the decades since the passage of the Clean Water 
Act (CWA), our nation’s waters remain impaired by 
dangerous levels of nutrients such as phosphorous and 
nitrogen, which can cause serious health impacts.1  
Excess nutrients also have a substantial environmental 
impact on waterbodies,2 which in turn diminishes the 
recreational value of these resources.3  Efforts to control 
these nutrient levels place a substantial economic burden 
on local governments in both providing clean drinking 
water as well as treating wastewater.4  The CWA’s 
cooperative federalism approach divides sources of 
nutrient pollution into two categories: (1) point sources, 
 
      * The author thanks Professor Sara Rollet Gosman, and several members of the 
Arkansas Bar Association Environmental Law Section for their guidance, encouragement, 
and criticism throughout the drafting of this comment.  All errors remain the author’s.  Any 
comments or questions may be directed to the author at nrfinch@gmail.com. 
1.  The Problem, EPA, http://www2.epa.gov/nutrientpollution/problem 
[https://perma.cc/9FZF-93XY] (“Nutrient pollution is one of nation’s most 
widespread, costly and challenging environmental problems.”); ARK. NAT. RES. 
COMM’N, 2011-2016 NONPOINT SOURCE POLLUTION MANAGEMENT PLAN 53, 54 
(2012) [hereinafter NONPOINT SOURCE POLLUTION MANAGEMENT PLAN], 
http://www.arkansaswater.org/data/Full_NPSPlan_Document.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/U53K-ZXJ2]. 
2.  The Effects: Environment, EPA, 
https://www.epa.gov/nutrientpollution/effects-environment [https://perma.cc/GW3Z-
Q86V]. 
3.  EPA, THE FACTS ABOUT NUTRIENT POLLUTION 2 (2012), 
https://www.epa.gov/sites/production/files/2015-
03/documents/facts_about_nutrient_pollution_what_is_hypoxia.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/FG7D-K4VH] (noting that the U.S. economy loses close to $1 
billion annually from losses in fishing and other recreational activities). 
4.  Kan. State Univ., Freshwater Pollution Costs US At Least $4.3 Billion a 
Year, SCI. DAILY (Nov. 17, 2008), 
http://www.sciencedaily.com/releases/2008/11/081112124418.htm. 
[https://perma.cc/DN7F-N6K8]. 
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and (2) nonpoint sources.5  Point sources are “discrete 
conveyance[s]” such as the end of a pipe from an 
industrial facility or municipal wastewater treatment plant 
discharging to surface waters.6  Nonpoint sources are 
every other source,7 but most nonpoint source nutrient 
loads come from agricultural activities and increasing 
urbanization.8  The CWA places mandatory regulations on 
point sources, but nonpoint source regulations are largely 
determined at the state level.9 
Over the years, states have primarily addressed 
nonpoint source pollution by encouraging voluntary 
participation in federally funded programs.10  This 
approach has seen limited success.11  Because states 
have not made the necessary progress to reduce nutrient 
loads from nonpoint sources of pollution, the burden to 
meet water quality standards in streams impaired by 
nutrient pollution is met by reducing the point source’s 
permit limits for nutrients—primarily affecting municipal 
wastewater treatment plants.12  Below certain levels, 
 
5.  33 U.S.C. § 1362(14) (2012); What is Nonpoint Source?, EPA, 
http://www.epa.gov/polluted-runoff-nonpoint-source-pollution/what-nonpoint-source 
[https://perma.cc/YD8T-CBC3]. 
6.  33 U.S.C. § 1362(14). 
7.  What is Nonpoint Source?, supra note 5 (noting that a “nonpoint source” is 
“any source of water pollution that does not meet the legal definition of ‘point 
source’”). 
8.  See id. 
9.   ROBERT V. PERCIVAL ET AL., ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION: LAW, SCIENCE, 
AND POLICY 663-66 (7th ed. 2013). 
10.  Lara D. Guercio, The Struggle Between Man and Nature—Agriculture, 
Nonpoint Source Pollution, and Clean Water: How to Implement the State of 
Vermont’s Phosphorous TMDL Within the Lake Champlain Basin, 12 VT. J. ENVTL. 
L. 455, 466-69 (2011). 
11.  See EPA: OFFICE OF WATER, WATER QUALITY TRADING POLICY 1 (2003) 
[hereinafter WATER QUALITY TRADING POLICY], 
http://archive.epa.gov/ncer/events/calendar/archive/web/pdf/finalpolicy2003.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/BEG9-JMRW].  A 2000 assessment revealed that “approximately 
40% of the rivers, 45% of the streams and 50% of the lakes that have been 
assessed still do not support their designated uses” due to uncontrolled increases 
in nonpoint source pollution.  Id.  Since 2014, the U.S. House of Representatives 
Subcommittee on Water Resources and Environment has recognized the 
continuing need for pollution reductions from nonpoint sources.  See The Role of 
Water Quality Trading in Achieving Clean Water Objectives: Hearing Before the 
Subcomm. on Water Res. and Env’t of the H. Comm. on Transp. and 
Infrastructure, 113th Cong. vi (2014). 
12.   WATER QUALITY TRADING POLICY, supra note 11, at 6-7. 
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further reductions from point sources are no longer an 
economically efficient means of achieving water quality 
standards.13 
In 2015, Arkansas took an important step toward 
addressing this inefficient approach by passing Act 335.14  
Act 335 provides legislative approval for “nutrient water 
quality trading programs,” including the use of credits, 
offsets, and compliance associations.15  This voluntary 
market-based approach is the first step toward a system 
wherein the mandatory reductions from point sources may 
be achieved by either purchasing credits generated by 
nonpoint sources that voluntarily reduce their nutrient load 
or through compliance associations, which facilitate trades 
between point sources.16  Act 335 sets the foundation 
upon which a regulatory framework can be constructed to 
guide and encourage a voluntary market-based solution in 
local watersheds.17  State regulatory agencies must now 
collaborate with the governor’s appointed advisory panel 
and other stakeholders to develop a regulatory framework 
that will retain the economic efficiencies available through 
trading without unnecessarily risking those gains to costly 
litigation, administrative delays, or water quality 
degradation.18 
This comment provides policy recommendations for 
developing a comprehensive nutrient water quality trading 
framework, which will reduce litigation risk and delayed 
 
13.  The Role of Water Quality Trading in Achieving Clean Water Objectives, 
supra note 11, at 1-2. 
14.  Act 335, 2015 Ark. Act 1512 (codified at ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 8-4-232, 233 
(Supp. 2015)). 
15.  Act 335, 2015 Ark. Act 1512, 1514 (codified at ARK. CODE ANN. § 8-4-
232(b)(1)-(2) (Supp. 2015)). 
16.   Act 335, 2015 Ark. Act 1512, 1514-15 (codified at ARK. CODE ANN. § 8-
4-232(c)-(d) (Supp. 2015)). 
17.   Act 335, 2015 Ark. Act 1512 (codified at ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 8-4-232, 
233). 
18.  See ARK. CODE ANN. § 8-4-215 (Supp. 2015); Am. Farm Bureau Fed’n v. 
EPA, 792 F.3d 281, 309-10 (3d Cir. 2015) (rejecting challenge from nonpoint 
sources and deferring to EPA’s heightened requirements for Chesapeake Bay 
TMDL, which is the cornerstone of nutrient trading in the Bay); Food & Water 
Watch v. EPA, 5 F. Supp. 3d 62, 85 (D.D.C. 2013) (rejecting environmental 
group’s challenge to EPA approval of multi-state nutrient trading scheme in the 
Chesapeake Bay because they could not establish standing or show how EPA 
approval of trading was “final agency action”). 
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implementation.  Part II provides a background on what 
the CWA requires of point and nonpoint source 
dischargers, the United States Environmental Protection 
Agency’s (EPA) ongoing support of watershed-based 
trading programs, and the judicial developments regarding 
trading.  Part III offers suggestions for developing a 
statewide trading framework by focusing on four key 
areas: (1) requiring participating watersheds to use 
numeric criteria to measure the targeted nutrient; (2) 
limiting trading to those watersheds with Total Maximum 
Daily Loads (TMDL) for nutrients; (3) prohibiting trades 
that are likely to result in impairment; and, most 
importantly, (4) determining how credits may be generated 
by point and nonpoint sources.  This fourth area will 
require the advisory panel and state regulatory agencies 
to create rules concerning credit baselines, monitoring, 
uncertainty, and timing issues.19 
II.  BACKGROUND 
The difficulties associated with developing localized 
water quality trading programs stem from the construction 
of the CWA.  Congress’s intent in passing the CWA was to 
eliminate all sources of water pollution—a lofty goal.20  
Congress supported this goal through mandatory federal 
regulations on the low-hanging fruit—point sources—but 
then required states to cooperate by regulating all other 
sources—nonpoint sources.  In the years since the 
passage of the CWA, our nation’s water has improved 
significantly in many regards.21  However, as waterbodies 
 
19.  EPA: OFFICE OF WASTEWATER MANAGEMENT: WATER PERMITS DIVISION, 
WATER QUALITY TRADING TOOLKIT FOR PERMIT WRITERS 10 (2009) [hereinafter 
WATER QUALITY TRADING TOOLKIT], 
http://www3.epa.gov/npdes/pubs/wqtradingtoolkit.pdf [https://perma.cc/5V6H-
7E2F]. 
20.  See 33 U.S.C. § 1251(a)(1) (2012). 
21.  William L. Andreen, Success and Backlash: The Remarkable 
(Continuing) Story of the Clean Water Act, 4 GEO. WASH. J. ENERGY & ENVTL. L. 
25, 30 (2013) (“[I]mplementation of the section 404 program in the 1970s has 
brought about a substantial decline in the rate of wetlands loss.  From the mid-
1970s to the mid-1980s, wetlands losses in the conterminous United States fell to 
approximately 290,000 acres each year, about half of the average annual losses 
experienced during the twenty years before the Act was implemented.”); EPA: 
OFFICE OF WASTEWATER MGMT., PROGRESS IN WATER QUALITY: AN EVALUATION OF 
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become increasingly impaired by excess nutrients from 
nonpoint sources, states have come under greater 
pressure to find ways to reduce nonpoint source nutrient 
loads.22  This growing issue has also put increased 
pressure on the federal government to do more to regulate 
nonpoint sources, which has led to a struggle over what 
EPA can require of states under the CWA to achieve the 
congressional mandate of eliminating water pollution.23  
Since 1996, EPA has supported state and local watershed 
trading programs.  In recent years, EPA has offered 
guidance24 and funding for state trading programs,25 but 
litigation brought by both environmental and industry 
advocates continues to be a costly impediment to the 
success of several of these trading programs.26  Without a 
balanced approach that encourages local trades while 
achieving quantifiable reductions from nonpoint sources, 
 
THE NATIONAL INVESTMENT IN MUNICIPAL WASTEWATER TREATMENT 7 (2000) 
[hereinafter PROGRESS IN WATER QUALITY], https://www.epa.gov/nscep 
[https://perma.cc/RC67-C4Q3] (“[T]he 45 percent nationwide reduction in effluent 
BOD5 loading and the 23 percent reduction in effluent BODU loading was achieved during a period when total population served and influent loading of BOD both 
increased by 35 percent!”). 
22.  See Mohammad O. Jazil & David W. Childs, EPA Imposes Strict 
Numeric Nutrient Criteria in Florida: Background and Implications, 43 TRENDS 6, 6 
(2011). 
23.  See id. at 7; Am. Farm Bureau Fed’n v. EPA, 792 F.3d 281, 287 (3d Cir. 
2015). 
24.  See WATER QUALITY TRADING POLICY, supra note 11; WATER QUALITY 
TRADING TOOLKIT, supra note 19, at 1; EPA, WATER QUALITY TRADING ASSESSMENT 
HANDBOOK i (2004) [hereinafter WATER QUALITY TRADING ASSESSMENT 
HANDBOOK], https://www.epa.gov/nscep [https://perma.cc/8NCF-4SWR]; 
Memorandum from Nancy K. Stoner, Acting Assistant Adm’r, to Regional 
Administrators, Working in Partnership with States to Address Phosphorus and 
Nitrogen Pollution through Use of a Framework for State Nutrient Reductions, at 1 
(Mar. 16, 2011), 
http://www.epa.gov/sites/production/files/documents/memo_nitrogen_framework.p
df [https://perma.cc/2UEY-59XL]. 
25.  33 U.S.C. § 1329(h)(1) (2012); see also NONPOINT SOURCE POLLUTION 
MANAGEMENT PLAN, supra note 1, at 24.  
26.  See Food & Water Watch v. EPA, 5 F. Supp. 3d 62 (D.D.C. 2013) 
(rejecting environmental group’s challenge to EPA’s multi-state nutrient trading 
scheme because they could not establish standing or show how EPA approval of 
trading was final agency action); Am. Farm Bureau Fed’n v. EPA, 792 F.3d 281 
(3d Cir. 2015) (rejecting a majority of trade association’s challenges to EPA’s 
Clean Water Act TMDL regulations and narrowly directing clarification of 
ambiguous terms in the act at cost of trade association). 
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the alternative may be mandatory regulations extended to 
nonpoint sources.27 
A. The Requirements of the Clean Water Act 
In 1972, the CWA received overwhelming bipartisan 
support at a time when rivers caught fire and were 
biologically unfit for leeches—much less fish.28  The 
objective of the CWA is “to restore and maintain the 
chemical, physical, and biological integrity of the Nation’s 
waters” by eliminating the discharge of pollutants into 
navigable waters by 1985 and by attaining water quality 
which “provides for the protection and propagation of fish, 
shellfish, and wildlife and provides for recreation in and on 
the water [by 1983].”29  In the spirit of cooperative 
federalism, enforcement of the CWA has been delegated 
to forty-six states—including Arkansas—with EPA 
oversight.30 
1. Point Sources 
Congress saw that it could achieve rapid reductions in 
water pollution nationwide by targeting “any discernible, 
confined and discrete conveyance, including but not 
limited to any pipe” discharging pollutants to surface 
waters—referred to as a “point source” in the Act.31  Point 
sources are required to obtain a National Pollutant 
Discharge Elimination System (NPDES) permit.32  This 
permit places limits on the quantities of various pollutants 
 
27.  See NONPOINT SOURCE POLLUTION MANAGEMENT PLAN, supra note 1, at 
58.  
28.  Jennifer Latson, The Burning River That Sparked a Revolution, TIME 
(June 22, 2015), http://time.com/3921976/cuyahoga-fire/ [https://perma.cc/X9BT-
A8TW]; Peter Lehner, House Republicans Wage War on clean Water, NATURAL 
RESOURCES DEFENSE COUNCIL (July 16, 2014), https://www.nrdc.org/experts/peter-
lehner/house-republicans-wage-war-clean-water [https://perma.cc/5P28-6823 ]. 
29.  33 U.S.C. § 1251(a) (2012). 
30.  EPA Announces Plan to “Revamp” CWA Enforcement Approach, 
BEVERIDGE & DIAMOND, PC, (Oct. 16, 2009), http://www.bdlaw.com/news-705.html 
[https://perma.cc/28GV-BTWA]; Enforcement Analysts, ARK. DEP’T OF ENVTL. 
QUALITY, https://www.adeq.state.ar.us/water/enforcement/analysts.aspx 
[https://perma.cc/N8VP-JHM9]. 
31.  See 33 U.S.C. § 1362(14) (2012). 
32.  33 U.S.C. § 1342(a)(1) (2012). 
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the point source may discharge.33  The limits will be the 
more stringent of Technology-Based Effluent Limitations 
(TBEL), which generally require that the best technology 
for a given category of dischargers be used, or Water-
Quality Based Effluent Limitations (WQBEL), which are set 
to assure that the state water quality standards are met.34 
The CWA also requires states to inventory 
waterbodies based on whether or not the waterbody is 
attaining its designated use—known as 303(d) lists.35  The 
waterbodies that do not meet the state’s designated 
beneficial uses based on water quality standards and their 
associated criteria are deemed impaired.36  From the 
prioritized list of impaired waterbodies, the CWA then 
requires states to establish a TMDL.37  The TMDL, known 
colloquially as a “pollution diet,”38 establishes the 
maximum amount of a pollutant the watershed can absorb 
before exceeding the associated water quality standards 
and designated uses (e.g., fishable, swimmable, 
drinkable).39  The TMDL is established by calculating the 
“waste load allocation” for point sources plus the “load 
allocation” for nonpoint sources plus a margin of safety.40  
However, only point sources are required to reduce their 
discharge to comply with the heightened NPDES permit 
restrictions that result from this TMDL analysis.41 
2. Nonpoint Sources 
 
33.  See WATER QUALITY TRADING TOOLKIT, supra note 19, at 5-6. 
34.  Id. 
35.  33 U.S.C. § 1313(d)-(e) (2012). 
36.  2 U.S. ARMY CORPS OF ENG’RS, UC MERCED AND UNIVERSITY COMMUNITY 
PROJECT DRAFT ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT/ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT 
REPORT 4.8-16 (2008), 
http://opb.ucmerced.edu/sites/opb.ucmerced.edu/files/documents/vol2_deir_ucmer
ced_small.pdf. [https://perma.cc/XF47-9AMZ]. 
37.  Guercio, supra note 10, at 457-58. 
38.  Chesapeake Bay Total Maximum Daily Load (TMDL), EPA, 
https://www.epa.gov/chesapeake-bay-tmdl [https://perma.cc/5TGZ-H3ZX]. 
39.  33 U.S.C. § 1313(d)(C)-(D) (2012). 
40.  33 U.S.C. § 1313(d)(D) (2012). 
41.  See 33 U.S.C. § 1342(k) (2012).  Hypothetically, the TMDL analysis 
could find that nonpoint sources account for ninety-nine percent of the nutrient load 
to the waterway, but only the permitted point sources would be required to reduce 
their discharge to comply with the water quality standard.  
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Regulating point sources put the fire out on the 
Cuyahoga River and improved countless other 
waterbodies across the nation,42 but excessive nutrient 
pollution from nonpoint sources remains a threat to the 
health and economic vitality of many areas of the 
country.43  The nutrients of greatest concern are nitrogen 
and phosphorous.44  The main sources of excess nutrients 
in our waterways are agriculture and increasing 
urbanization.45  Excess nutrients from agriculture come 
from animal manure and soil erosion associated with 
livestock and crop production.  The increasing amount of 
impervious surfaces—roofs, roads, and parking lots—that 
come with expanding urbanization leads to more 
stormwater being directed into small streams and 
ditches.46  The increased volume and velocity of water in 
these natural channels also leads to further soil erosion.47  
Eroded stream banks release the nutrients that have built 
up in that soil over decades.48  Because the nutrient loads 
from nonpoint sources are the result of diffuse stormwater 
runoff from, for example, farm fields, and neighborhoods 
 
42.  PROGRESS IN WATER QUALITY, supra note 21, at 13; Latson, supra note 
28. 
43.  EPA, THE FACTS ABOUT NUTRIENT POLLUTION, supra note 3, at 1-2. 
44.  Id.; Memorandum from Nancy K. Stoner, supra note 24. 
45.  EPA, THE FACTS ABOUT NUTRIENT POLLUTION, supra note 3, at 1; 
NONPOINT SOURCE POLLUTION MANAGEMENT PLAN, supra note 1, at 58-60.  The 
Arkansas Natural Resources Commission (ANRC) has implemented nonpoint 
source regulations for farmers in “nutrient surplus areas,” such as Northwestern 
Arkansas.  Id. at 1-2.  Additionally, Concentrated Animal Feeding Operations 
(CAFOs) and stormwater systems for municipalities and construction sites may be 
required to obtain NPDES permits under changing state and federal regulations.  
Id. at 1. 
46.  Although the stormwater discharges from many cities and towns are 
classified as point sources, thereby required to obtain NPDES permits, the permit 
requirements for Municipal Separate Storm Sewer Systems (MS4) are more 
similar to nonpoint source regulations in that they typically do not set a nutrient 
discharge limit but require cities to educate the community and use BMPs to 
achieve pollution reductions.  See 33 U.S.C. § 1342(p) (2012); see also NPDES 
Stormwater Program, EPA, https://www.epa.gov/npdes/npdes-stormwater-program 
[https://perma.cc/M56Y-2NL8]. 
47.  Id. 
48.  ANDREW SHARPLEY, PENN STATE COLL. OF AGRIC. SCI.: AGRIC. RESEARCH 
& COOP. EXTENSION, MANAGING PHOSPHORUS FOR AGRICULTURE AND THE 
ENVIRONMENT 8 (2001), http://extension.psu.edu/plants/nutrient-
management/educational/soil-fertility/managing-phosphorus-for-agriculture-and-
the-environment [https://perma.cc/8B47-LASR]. 
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rather than a discrete pipe, they are considered nonpoint 
sources.49  These nonpoint sources of nutrient pollution 
mix with point source discharges and together cause the 
economic and environmental harms discussed above. 
The CWA leaves the regulation of nonpoint sources to 
the states in its cooperative federalism approach, but it 
clearly intends for both point and nonpoint sources of 
pollution to be controlled “in an expeditious manner so as 
to enable the goals of [the CWA] to be met . . . .”50  
Despite the CWA’s federal funding provisions aimed at 
reducing nonpoint source pollution,51 the effort among 
states to reduce nonpoint sources of pollution through 
voluntary adoption of best management practices (BMP) 
has been neither effective nor expeditious.52 
In 1987, Congress amended the CWA to address the 
growing problem of nonpoint source pollution.53  Congress 
changed the designation of some municipal, industrial, 
and construction site stormwater discharges (e.g., certain 
street and parking lot drainage systems) from nonpoint 
sources to point sources, thereby requiring some of those 
sources to obtain NPDES permits.54 
The 1987 CWA Amendments also added Section 
319, which requires states to identify nonpoint sources of 
pollution and develop management plans for bodies of 
water impaired by those sources.55  However, much like 
its predecessor Section 208, Section 319 does not require 
state management programs to place any mandatory 
regulations on nonpoint sources, making it a largely 
ineffective pollution reduction tool.56  Despite the 
availability of federal resources, voluntary programs 
 
49.  See What is Nonpoint Source?, supra note 5. 
50.  33 U.S.C. § 1251(a)(7) (2012). 
51.  See 33 U.S.C. § 1329(h) (2012). 
52.  Robin Kundis Craig & Anna M. Roberts, When Will Governments 
Regulate Nonpoint Source Pollution? A Comparative Perspective, 42 B.C. ENVTL. 
AFF. L. REV. 1, 11-13 (2015).  
53. Id. at 11.  
54. Id.; 33 U.S.C. § 1342(p) (2012).  
55.  33 U.S.C. § 1329(b) (2012).  These management programs are required 
to identify and implement best management practices to control nonpoint source 
pollution.  Id. 
56.  33 U.S.C. § 1329(h) (2012); 33 U.S.C. § 1288(a)(1) (2012). 
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encouraging BMPs have not achieved the large-scale 
nutrient reductions needed from nonpoint sources.57 
To date, the most effective tool in the CWA for 
addressing nonpoint source pollution has been the citizen 
suit provision.58  Citizen suits have compelled EPA to 
establish TMDLs in twenty-seven cases due to 
noncompliance with the CWA.59  The TMDL establishes 
load allocations for point sources and nonpoint sources, 
which provides not only a pollutant load cap, but also data 
on the quantity of the target pollutant that can be attributed 
to nonpoint sources.60  Using this information, local 
watershed protection groups and the regulated point 
sources began developing localized water quality trading 
programs wherein nonpoint sources could voluntarily 
implement BMPs designed to reduce their load of the 
targeted pollutant.61 
 As states and EPA began complying with the CWA 
by establishing TMDLs for impaired waterbodies, point 
sources were required to invest in increasingly expensive 
technologies with diminishing marginal returns relative to 
cost.62  This in turn put pressure on regulated point 
sources at the local level—wastewater treatment plants—
to lobby their state legislators to bring nonpoint sources 
into the pollution reduction equation.63  Some states have 
now placed mandatory regulations on nonpoint source 
 
57.  David Zaring, Note, Agriculture, Nonpoint Source Pollution, and 
Regulatory Control: The Clean Water Act’s Bleak Present and Future, 20 HARV. 
ENVTL. L. REV. 515, 526-28 (1996). 
58.  33 U.S.C. § 1365 (2012); Guercio, supra note 10, at 472 (discussing the 
impact citizen suits had in spurring TMDL implementation by states or EPA). 
59.  Guercio, supra note 10, at 472. 
60.  33 U.S.C. § 1313 (d)(1)(C)-(D) (2012). 
61.  See WATER QUALITY TRADING POLICY, supra note 11, at 2.   
62.  See WATER QUALITY TRADING TOOLKIT, supra note 19, at 6.  
63.  See, e.g., Act 335, 2015 Ark. Act 1512 (codified at ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 8-
4-232, 233 (Supp. 2015)).  In Arkansas, the Arkansas Water and Wastewater 
Managers Association (AWWMA) was instrumental in bringing about Act 335 and 
the alternative means of NPDES permit compliance it allows for under the umbrella 
of nutrient water quality trading.  A Basic History and Vision of Nutrient Trading 
and Act 355 2-3 (NWA Intergovernmental Working Grp. & NWA Stakeholders, 
Informational White Paper, 2015), 
http://www.arkwwma.org/pdf/VisionOfNutrientTradingEvolutionOfAct335.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/53FB-8RMC]. 
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nutrient loads, but Arkansas may be able to avoid that by 
implementing an effective trading program. 
B. EPA Support for Water Quality Trading 
In 1996, EPA promoted watershed-based trading as 
an innovative way of achieving water quality standards.64  
Two years later, EPA collaborated with the United States 
Department of Agriculture (USDA) to protect watersheds 
through the “Clean Water Action Plan,” which would 
provide federal funds to local stakeholders developing 
programs to reduce pollution from point sources and 
nonpoint sources.65  By 2003, EPA published its official 
Water Quality Trading Policy, which formalized its support 
for using trading to achieve nutrient and sediment 
reductions from nonpoint sources.66  The agency then 
published a Water Quality Trading Assessment Handbook 
to provide step-by-step guidance for local stakeholders 
considering using water quality trading in their 
watershed.67 
In 2008, EPA released an evaluation of trading 
programs and found that, despite efforts to promote the 
programs, there were significant hurdles to their success 
and expansion.68  The evaluation cited ambiguity in the 
CWA, over-burdened permit writers, cautious legal 
counsel, and local conditions such as the “regulatory, 
economic, hydrologic, and geographic circumstances” of 
each watershed, as impediments to effective trading 
programs.69  The agency concluded that trading “may be 
limited to areas where program coordinators have both a 
high level of interest in trading and the talent needed to 
 
64.  Effluent Trading in Watersheds Policy Statement, 61 Fed. Reg. 4,994-01, 
4995 (Feb. 9, 1996). 
65.  CAROL BROWNER & DAN GLICKMAN, CLEAN WATER ACTION PLAN: 
RESTORING AND PROTECTING AMERICA’S WATERS iii-iv (1998). 
66.  See WATER QUALITY TRADING POLICY, supra note 11, at 1.  Despite this 
formal policy statement and numerous guidance documents, neither the CWA nor 
federal regulations have been amended to formally recognize trading.  See id. 
67.  See WATER QUALITY TRADING ASSESSMENT HANDBOOK, supra note 24, at 
5-26. 
68.  EPA, WATER QUALITY TRADING EVALUATION 4-1 (2008), 
https://www.epa.gov/sites/production/files/2015-09/documents/epa-water-quality-
trading-evaluation.pdf [https://perma.cc/6W8B-YBH2]. 
69.  Id. 
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shepherd stakeholders through a challenging program 
development and implementation process.”70  EPA’s 
support and guidance has been consistent over the past 
decade, yet most states are reluctant to develop the 
TMDLs and nutrient criteria necessary to implement 
efficient and successful trading programs.71 
C. Judicial Developments Regarding Water Quality 
Trading Programs 
Even when trading programs receive local support 
and EPA approval, they remain subject to judicial 
scrutiny.72  The CWA’s citizen suit provision gives any 
citizen with standing the right to sue.73  EPA has fought 
against several of these lawsuits brought by both 
environmental and industrial interests claiming injury from 
the agency’s action or inaction regarding water quality 
trading programs.74 
The litigation has ranged from broad claims that EPA 
lacks the authority under the CWA to approve any 
pollution-trading scheme,75 to narrower claims challenging 
elements of a trading framework,76 as well as the typical 
questions around whether EPA’s regulatory interpretations 
were appropriate.77  The threshold legal question of 
whether trading is allowed under the CWA appears to be 
supported by the deference given to regional 
 
70.  Id.  
71.  Id. 
72.  See, e.g., Friends of Pinto Creek v. EPA, 504 F.3d 1007, 1009 (9th Cir. 
2007) (rejecting EPA approval of NPDES permit allowing for pollution offsets in a 
303(d) listed stream); cf. In re Cities of Annandale & Maple Lake, 731 N.W.2d 502, 
524 (Minn. 2007) (affirming state pollution control agency’s issuance of NPDES 
permit that allowed for a new municipal wastewater treatment plant to discharge 
phosphorous to a phosphorous impaired stream when that additional pollution 
would be offset by reductions from a nearby plant). 
73.  33 U.S.C. § 1365(a) (2012). 
74.  See, e.g., Am. Farm Bureau Fed’n v. EPA, 792 F.3d 281, 293 (3d Cir. 
2015); Food & Water Watch v. EPA, 5 F. Supp. 3d 62, 73 (D.D.C. 2013). 
75.  See, e.g., Food & Water Watch, 5 F. Supp. 3d at 66. 
76.  See Am. Farm Bureau Fed’n, 792 F.3d at 294; see also Jazil & Childs, 
supra note 22.  
77.  See 40 C.F.R. § 122.4(i) (2015); Friends of Pinto Creek, 504 F.3d at 
1011-12 (challenging agency interpretations of whether offsets would “cause or 
contribute to” a numeric or narrative water quality standard violation); In re Cities of 
Annandale & Maple Lake, 731 N.W.2d at 507. 
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administrators under CWA Section 402(a)(2) to issue 
NPDES permits that “assure compliance . . . including 
conditions on data and information collection, reporting, 
and such other requirements as he deems 
appropriate . . . .”78  Allowing point sources to meet their 
permit requirements through trading appears to be an 
appropriate means of assuring compliance, but should an 
injury result from that scheme, plaintiffs may have 
standing to sue.79  Courts have dealt with the narrower 
controversies by giving deference to agency 
interpretations where the statute is ambiguous and the 
agency interpretation is reasonable.80  In spite of this 
litigation, states are pursuing water quality trading 
programs with varying results.81 
In 2007, a divided Minnesota Supreme Court found 
that the state pollution control agency’s interpretation of 
federal regulations was reasonable82 when it decided that 
a new source of phosphorous in a phosphorous impaired 
waterbody would not “cause or contribute to the violation 
of water quality standards” due to an aggregate reduction 
from offsets.83  A few months later, the Ninth Circuit found 
in Friends of Pinto Creek v. EPA that offsets were 
irrelevant because federal regulations unambiguously 
prohibited the issuance of permits to new sources of 
pollution in an impaired waterbody without first accounting 
for how the water quality standard would be met in a 
TMDL.84 
 
78.  33. U.S.C. § 1342(a)(2) (2012). 
79.  Food & Water Watch, 5 F. Supp. 3d at 80 (dismissing complaint for lack 
of standing). 
80.  See, e.g., Am. Farm Bureau Fed’n v. EPA, 792 F.3d 281, 294-310 (3d 
Cir. 2015) (analyzing agency’s interpretation under the two-step test set out in 
Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984)). 
81.  See Water Quality Trading Programs, U.S. DEP’T OF AGRIC.: OFFICE OF 
THE CHIEF ECONOMIST, 
http://www.usda.gov/oce/environmental_markets/water_trading.htm 
[https://perma.cc/QVG6-MAWM]. 
82.  40 C.F.R. § 122.4(i); see also In re Cities of Annandale & Maple Lake, 
731 N.W.2d 502, 524 (Minn. 2007). 
83.  Id. at 524-25 (finding that regulation was ambiguous and agency 
interpretation was reasonable; however, dissenting justices finding federal 
regulation unambiguously prohibited approval of the permit). 
84.  504 F.3d 1007, 1011-12 (9th Cir. 2007) (finding that EPA’s NPDES 
permit approval violated the plain language of the federal regulation).  Decades 
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In Friends of Pinto Creek, the EPA and Carlota 
Copper argued that the agency’s NPDES permit approval 
was appropriate because the new discharge would be 
offset due to increased pollution reductions from a 
separate upstream point source and, therefore, would 
create no “detectable change in water quality.”85  The 
Ninth Circuit rejected this argument finding that although 
section 122.4(i)(2) does not prohibit NPDES permit 
approval to new sources discharging into impaired 
streams, it does require “(1) . . . sufficient remaining 
pollutant load allocations to allow for the discharge; and 
(2) [that] existing dischargers into that segment are subject 
to compliance schedules designed to bring the segment 
into compliance with applicable water quality standards.”86  
The court held that the purpose of section 122.4(i)(2) was 
not merely “to show a lessening of pollution, but to show 
how the water quality standards will be met if [the new 
source] is allowed to discharge pollutants into the impaired 
waters.”87  The Ninth Circuit vacated and remanded EPA’s 
permit.88  The Supreme Court denied requests for 
certiorari, despite the Ninth Circuit’s conflict with 
Minnesota’s Supreme Court.89  If Arkansas relies on the 
Ninth Circuit’s precedent when developing its water quality 
trading program, then any new sources discharging 
nutrient pollution to a nutrient impaired waterway will have 
to be accounted for in a TMDL.  The availability of trading, 
however, could alleviate some of the burden imposed by 
the pollution restrictions required of point sources under a 
TMDL. 
 
prior to the Ninth Circuit’s decision in Friends of Pinto Creek, the Supreme Court 
reversed a similar finding from the Tenth Circuit in Arkansas v. Oklahoma, 503 
U.S. 91 (1992).  Id. at 1013-14.  In Arkansas, the Court found that the Tenth Circuit 
inappropriately interjected its interpretation of the CWA that no permits could be 
issued to new sources that would contribute to a water quality violation, but only 
because neither party raised the issue and deference to EPA’s approval was 
appropriate where there would be no “detectable change in water quality.”  Id. at 
1013. 
85.  Friends of Pinto Creek, 504 F.3d at 1013 (quoting Arkansas v. 
Oklahoma, 503 U.S. 91 (1992)). 
86.  Id. at 1013. 
87.  Id. at 1014. 
88.  Id. at 1017. 
89.  Id.  
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As courts require states and EPA to comply with the 
CWA by ordering the implementation of TMDLs, the 
interest in trading schemes grows.90  In thirty-eight of the 
states where environmentalists sought compliance with 
the Act’s TMDL requirement, twenty-two states were 
ordered to work with EPA to establish TMDLs for 
thousands of impaired waterbodies.91  In recent years, 
important TMDL litigation has centered on what EPA can 
require in establishing or approving a state’s TMDL for an 
impaired waterbody.92 
In the 2013 case Food & Water Watch v. EPA,93 
environmental advocates argued that EPA’s approval of a 
TMDL, which allowed for water quality trading as a means 
for attaining established water quality standards, would 
lead to pollution “hotspots” in the watershed and diminish 
their members’ use and enjoyment of the watershed.94  
The D.C. District Court dismissed plaintiffs’ claim on 
procedural grounds because they lacked standing due to 
the fact that EPA’s approval of a TMDL that allowed for 
trading pollution credits was not a final agency action, as 
required under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA).95  
The court reasoned that EPA approved trading as a tool 
that could be used to meet permit requirements—but was 
not an agency requirement.96  Furthermore, the court 
found that the plaintiffs suffered no “actual or imminent” 
harm as a result of the approved trading programs.97  
Agency action will be final and the injury will be actual or 
imminent only if the agency approves trades or offsets that 
can be proven to create hotspots or some other harm.98 
 
90.  Am. Farm Bureau Fed’n v. EPA, 792 F.3d 281, 290 (3d Cir. 2015).  
91.  CLAUDIA COPELAND, CRS REPORT FOR CONGRESS: CLEAN WATER ACT 
AND TOTAL MAXIMUM DAILY LOADS (TMDLS) OF POLLUTANTS 2-3 (2008), 
http://nationalaglawcenter.org/wp-content/uploads/assets/crs/97-831.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/9G2H-3JBW]. 
92.  See Am. Farm Bureau Fed’n, 792 F.3d at 287; see also Food & Water 
Watch v. EPA, 5 F. Supp. 3d 62, 66 (D.D.C. 2013). 
93.  Food & Water Watch, 5 F. Supp. 3d at 62. 
94.  Id. at 73-74. 
95.  5 U.S.C. § 704 (2006); Food & Water Watch, 5 F. Supp. 3d at 81-85. 
96.  Food & Water Watch, 5 F. Supp. 3d at 82.  
97.  Id. at 74-75. 
98.  Id. at 73-74, 81-82. 
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In 2015, the Third Circuit applied Chevron deference 
to EPA’s interpretation of the CWA’s TMDL requirement.99  
In American Farm Bureau Federation, the court found that 
the words “total maximum daily load” were ambiguous;100 
thus, Chevron deference was appropriate and the 
agency’s interpretation was deemed reasonable in light of 
Congressional intent.101  EPA interpreted the CWA “to 
require publication of a comprehensive framework for 
pollution reduction in a given body of water.”102  The 
American Farm Bureau Federation argued that in 
establishing a TMDL, EPA could do nothing more than 
calculate a numeric value identifying the maximum 
pollution loads in a waterbody and then leave the state to 
decide what actions—if any—would be taken to meet the 
TMDL.103  The Third Circuit found that EPA’s interpretation 
of its role in establishing TMDLs did not infringe on states’ 
rights when requiring them to outline how the TMDL would 
be met and what the state would do if the TMDL were not 
met.104 
These judicial developments, along with EPA 
guidance, establish guideposts for developing Arkansas’s 
nutrient water quality trading program.  Admittedly, these 
guideposts leave much to be desired in terms of clarity 
and finality.  However, they remain important markers in 
the historical development of water quality trading worthy 
of analysis when creating Arkansas’s new regulatory 
framework. 
 
 
 
III.  DEVELOPING A FRAMEWORK FOR NUTRIENT 
WATER QUALITY TRADING 
 
99.  Am. Farm Bureau Fed’n v. EPA, 792 F.3d 281, 294-309 (3d Cir. 2015).  
See generally Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 
(1984) (articulating the appropriate standard to use when reviewing an agency’s 
construction of a statute it administers). 
100.  See Am. Farm Bureau Fed’n, 792 F.3d at 297-98. 
101.  See id. at 301-06.  
102.  Id. at 288.  
103.  Id. at 297-99.  
104.  Id. at 301-06.  
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In order for water quality trading programs to succeed 
in Arkansas, the way in which these programs are viewed 
by environmental advocates, regulatory agencies, and 
regulated parties must change.  Trading cannot continue 
to be characterized as pay-to-pollute by the environmental 
community.105  Whether the regulated point source pays 
for advanced technology to meet the water quality 
standard, pays for BMPs at a nonpoint source, or 
contracts for point source trades to achieve the same—or 
greater—reduction, the reduction will have a cost.  It is 
simply a question of how much the point source must pay 
and whether the water quality standard can be achieved 
through nonpoint source trades.  Point sources have 
achieved great reductions in nutrient discharges under the 
CWA regulations over the past forty years, but the 
objectives of the CWA cannot be met by controlling point 
sources alone.106  For instance, in many municipalities it is 
no longer economically efficient to require ever-greater 
phosphorous or nitrogen reductions from point sources 
(primarily wastewater treatment plants) while exempting 
nonpoint sources (primarily agricultural land and urban 
centers).107 
Nutrient water quality trading will provide an 
opportunity for nonpoint sources to voluntarily reduce their 
contribution to the nutrient pollution problem.  In return, 
point sources may purchase credits that will be generated 
by the nonpoint source’s reduction.  When the cost for 
 
105.  See Zach Corrigan, The Case Against Water Quality Trading, 30 NAT. 
RESOURCES & ENV’T 15, 16-17 (2015). 
106.  Id. at 15-17.  
107.  Presentation, Billy Ammons & Heath Ward, City of Fayetteville, Nutrient 
Trading and Act 335: A Short History and Progress Report (undated) (on file with 
author) (showing cost of reducing phosphorous from a nonpoint source to be 
approximately $300,000 versus the cost of equal reductions from point source 
technology upgrades to be approximately $18,000,000); Letter from Lioneld 
Jordan, City of Fayetteville, Ark. Mayor, to Dr. Al Armendariz, EPA Region 6 
Admin’r 4 (Oct. 12, 2011), 
https://www3.epa.gov/region6/water/npdes/illinoisriverwatershed/documents/corres
pondence/cty-of-fayetteville-commit-to-waterquality-oct12-2011.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/PA9N-Y43F] (stating that planned point source reductions would 
cost $90-100 million in capital upgrades with questionable environmental benefit); 
The Role of Water Quality Trading in Achieving Clean Water Objectives, supra 
note 11, at 10-11 (citing the cost of point source reductions as at least two to three 
times greater than reductions from nonpoint sources). 
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nonpoint sources to generate credits is lower than the cost 
of investing in advanced technology at the point source, 
the point source will purchase the nonpoint source’s 
credits thereby creating a Nutrient Water Quality Trading 
market.108  Technological advancements such as using 
Geospatial Information Systems (GIS) to apply nutrients to 
agricultural land more efficiently,109 or using proven BMPs 
to reduce the amount of nutrients leaching into 
waterbodies110 coupled with advanced modeling and 
monitoring, are making it easier to verify the nutrient 
reductions from nonpoint sources.111  The certainty of 
these quantifications will likely never be as accurate as the 
measurements from the end of a point source pipe, but 
there are methods of accounting for this uncertainty, which 
make nutrient trading a cost-effective strategy for meeting 
water quality standards.112 
Similarly, regulated point sources must change the 
way they view the CWA’s TMDL requirement.  Historically, 
a TMDL meant that the state or EPA would analyze and 
allocate phosphorous loads for both point and nonpoint 
sources, then require only point sources to reduce their 
load in order to meet the water quality standard.113  It still 
does.114  However, with a trading program in place, point 
 
108.  See The Role of Water Quality Trading in Achieving Clean Water 
Objectives, supra note 11, at 3, 5, 11. 
109.  STATE OF ARK., ARKANSAS WATER PLAN: NUTRIENT REDUCTION 
STRATEGY 13-14, 
http://arkansaswaterplan.org/references/ar_nutrient_reduction_strategy101014.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/7LHG-DA7Y]. 
110.  See IOWA STATE UNIV. SCI. TEAM, IOWA NUTRIENT REDUCTION STRATEGY 
4-5 (2013), 
http://www.nutrientstrategy.iastate.edu/sites/default/files/documents/NRS2-
141001.pdf [https://perma.cc/H3FJ-ZNLV]. 
111.  See WATER QUALITY TRADING TOOLKIT, supra note 19, at 130.  
However, advancements in modeling and monitoring still do not provide 100% 
accuracy; watersheds are dynamic systems, which means uncertainty is inherent.  
See UNIV. OF ARK. DIV. OF AGRIC.: PUB. POLICY CTR., THE ROLE OF NONPOINT 
SOURCE MODELS IN WATERSHED MANAGEMENT 1, 3-4, 
https://www.uaex.edu/publications/pdf/FSPPC112.pdf [https://perma.cc/8N5P-
JBWR]. 
112.  See WATER QUALITY TRADING TOOLKIT, supra note 19, at 30-33. 
113.  Program Overview: Total Maximum Daily Loads (TMDL), EPA, 
https://www.epa.gov/tmdl/program-overview-total-maximum-daily-loads-tmdl 
[https://perma.cc/6FLZ-J2RL]. 
114.  See id. 
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sources will be able to achieve that reduction by 
purchasing less costly credits generated by nonpoint 
sources or other point sources.  The TMDL analysis is an 
essential starting point for understanding load allocations 
among all sources, which provides a foundation for this 
market-based solution.115  Although EPA has approved 
trading schemes in watersheds without a TMDL, those 
trades must be approved on a case-by-case basis, 
supported by TMDL-like analysis, and then included in the 
point source’s NPDES permit.116  Any trading flexibility lost 
due to the establishment of a TMDL is counterbalanced by 
greater load allocation certainty.  Greater certainty will 
make potential market participants more comfortable 
entering the market and regulatory agencies more likely to 
approve trading schemes, which in turn creates greater 
market efficiency.  None of this is possible without an 
updated regulatory framework, which allows trading 
programs to function as a viable tool. 
The difficulty for all parties lies in the details of 
structuring a program so that adequate checks are in 
place on the economic incentives to trading such that 
water quality standards are met.  Ultimately, the CWA 
requires point sources to make reductions that will meet 
water quality standards.117  Even in an approved trading 
program, if the standard is not met due to economically 
efficient though ineffective trades, the point source 
remains potentially liable for meeting the water quality 
standard.118 
Despite the challenges involved, Arkansas has the 
benefit of drawing on previous EPA decisions, court 
 
115.  See WATER QUALITY TRADING TOOLKIT, supra note 19, at 33 (supporting 
assertion that TMDLs were essential to EPA’s 2003 Water Quality Trading Policy 
and generally make trading more feasible). 
116.  WATER QUALITY TRADING POLICY, supra note 11, at 6; see, e.g., City of 
Fayetteville, Ark. Res. No. 59-06 (Mar. 21, 2006), 
http://www2.adeq.state.ar.us/downloads/WebDatabases/PermitsOnline/NPDES/Sp
ecialReports/AR0020010_Resolution%20No.%2059-06_20060321.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/7B5L-LSVS].  Although this Agreement was not technically a 
trade and was not created using TMDL-like analysis, it does exemplify ADEQ’s 
willingness to approve permits where nonpoint source reductions account for some 
portion of the point source’s requisite reductions.  Id. 
117.  See 33 U.S.C. § 1251 (2006). 
118.  See WATER QUALITY TRADING POLICY, supra note 11, at 5- 6. 
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precedents, and the successes or failures of other 
watersheds over the past thirty years to guide 
development of its regulatory framework.  By addressing 
the legally contentious aspects of nutrient trading, the 
administrative rulemaking process can result in a 
regulatory framework that satisfies the CWA’s mandates 
while encouraging cost-effective trades.119  This will be a 
very detail-specific process, but it will provide trading 
efficiency, verifiable reductions, and require buy-in from all 
interested parties, which will minimize litigation-risk.  
Important aspects of this framework should include: (1) the 
importance of numeric criteria for nutrients in those 
watersheds engaging in trading; (2) limitations on trades in 
watersheds without TMDLs for nutrients; (3) an express 
prohibition on trades that result in water quality 
impairments; and (4) clear requirements for how point and 
nonpoint sources may generate tradable credits. 
Act 335 brought about a collaborative approach to 
developing a nutrient trading program in Arkansas, starting 
with the appointment of an advisory panel.120  The 
advisory panel, appointed by Governor Asa Hutchinson, is 
made up of nine members representing specified 
interests, including NPDES permitees with valuable insight 
into how this regulatory framework may affect their 
operations.121  The advisory panel will offer essential 
stakeholder input, but the agency employees who are paid 
by the state for their experience and expertise in 
administering the state’s water quality regulations should 
take an active role in developing this framework as well.  
Working together, the stakeholders should address:  (1) 
the criteria used for limiting nutrient pollution; (2) the need 
for TMDLs in watersheds seeking to trade; (3) how to 
 
119.  See, e.g., 25 PA. CODE § 96.8 (2016) (establishing the use of offsets 
and tradable credits from pollution reduction activities in the Chesapeake Bay 
Watershed); see also WASH. ADMIN. CODE § 173-201A-450 (2015). 
120.  See Act 335, 2015 Ark. Act 1512, 1515-17 (codified at ARK. CODE ANN. 
§ 8-4-233 (Supp. 2015)); Press Release, Governor Asa Hutchinson Announces 
Appointments (July 1, 2015), http://governor.arkansas.gov/press-
releases/detail/governor-asa-hutchinson-announces-appointments-150701 
[https://perma.cc/TFH7-Y6DC]. 
121.  Act 335, 2015 Ark. Act 1512, 1515 (codified at ARK. CODE ANN. § 8-4-
233(a) (Supp. 2015)). 
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avoid hotspots and impairments caused by trading; and 
(4) the specific requirements for sources seeking to 
generate tradable credits. 
A. The Necessity of Numeric Criteria for Nutrients 
Deciding whether to use narrative or numeric criteria 
is a fundamental step in developing the regulations 
needed to encourage local trading programs.  The criteria 
to be used for individual pollutants are generally set by the 
state, and can be either narrative or numeric.122  Most 
states continue to use narrative criteria to determine 
whether a waterbody is nutrient impaired.123  However, 
allocations based on narrative criteria are inherently more 
subjective than those based on numeric criteria.124  
Moving toward numeric criteria for nutrients satisfies the 
CWA’s Section 304 requirement that EPA develop water 
quality criteria based on the latest scientific knowledge.125 
 
122.  33 U.S.C. § 1314(a)(1) (2012). 
123.  See State Progress Toward Developing Numeric Nutrient Water Quality 
Criteria for Nitrogen and Phosphorus, EPA, http://cfpub.epa.gov/wqsits/nnc-
development/ [https://perma.cc/JHJ4-E59A]. 
124.  See, e.g., Regulation Establishing Water Quality Standards for Surface 
Waters of the State of Arkansas, Ark. Pollution Control and Ecology Comm’n Reg. 
No. 2 § 2.509, 
http://www.sos.arkansas.gov/rulesRegs/Arkansas%20Register/2011/Oct11Reg/0.1
4.00.10-005.pdf [https://perma.cc/3X53-Z2C4].  A typical narrative nutrient criteria 
looks like this: “Materials stimulating algal growth shall not be present in 
concentrations sufficient to cause objectionable algal densities or other nuisance 
aquatic vegetation or otherwise impair any designated use of the waterbody.”  Id.  
Whereas the numeric criteria for Chlorophyll-a in Beaver Lake is more finite:   
 
Beaver Lake*:  
Chlorophyll-a (ug/L)** = 8; Secchi Transparency (m)*** = 1.1.   
*These standards are for measurement at the Hickory Creek site over 
the old thalweg, below the confluence of War Eagle Creek and the 
White River in Beaver Lake.   
**Growing season geometric mean (May - October).   
***Annual Average.   
 
See E-mail from Angela N. Danovi, Projects Manager, Ozarks Water Watch 
Found., to Doug Szenher (May 8, 2013, 4:01 CST) (on file with author).  Although 
numeric criteria are commonly used to measure pollutants such as metals in 
Arkansas, the quasi-numeric Chlorophyll-a criteria implemented for Beaver Lake is 
the first numeric criterion in the state to address nutrient pollution.  See id. 
125.  See 33 U.S.C. § 1314(a) (2012). 
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EPA has consistently pushed states to adopt numeric 
criteria for nutrients126 and the absence of numeric criteria 
could result in state or federal regulators rejecting a 
proposed trading program because of the additional 
complexity involved in interpreting narrative criteria.127  
Advances in technology make reliable numeric criteria for 
nutrients possible.128  Narrative criteria are used by trading 
programs in some jurisdictions, but permit writers must 
take extra precautions to comply with federal regulations 
requiring “reasonable potential” analysis of whether 
nutrient loads may exceed the state’s narrative criteria.129  
Although some jurisdictions have developed trading 
programs around narrative criteria,130 it is clear that 
numeric criteria provide greater certainty when developing 
TMDLs and trading programs.  This makes program 
approval more likely and creates a clear market demand—
based on a numeric value—that can be satisfied by credits 
incorporated into a point source’s NPDES permit. 
B. Limit Trading to Watersheds with TMDLs for 
Nutrients 
 
126.  See Memorandum from Nancy K. Stoner, supra note 24, at 2-3 (citing 
history of EPA encouraging states to implement numeric criteria for nutrients and 
their importance for developing effective trading programs); see also Sarah T. 
Babcock, Nutrient Trading as Clean Water Strategy in the Interstate Context, AM. 
BAR ASS’N: SECTION OF ENVTL. LITIG. (July 23, 2015), 
http://apps.americanbar.org/litigation/committees/environmental/articles/summer20
15-0615-nutrient-trading-clean-water-strategy-interstate-context.html 
[https://perma.cc/RYM9-MGJC]. 
127.  See ARK. DEP’T ENVTL. QUALITY, INTEGRATED WATER QUALITY 
MONITORING ASSESSMENT REPORT III-25 (2014), 
http://www2.adeq.state.ar.us/water/branch_planning/303d/pdfs/integrated_wqmar_
20140401.pdf [https://perma.cc/X5JF-3QAB]; see also EPA REGION III, LOCAL 
WATER QUALITY PROTECTION WHEN USING CREDITS FOR NPDES PERMIT ISSUANCE 
AND COMPLIANCE 8-9 (2014), http://www.epa.gov/sites/production/files/2015-
07/documents/localwaterqualitytm20140306pg.pdf [https://perma.cc/7VTW-AU5R]. 
128.  See Technical Support for Numeric Nutrient Criteria Development, EPA, 
http://www2.epa.gov/nutrient-policy-data/technical-support-numeric-nutrient-
criteria-development [https://perma.cc/U87A-AMKS]. 
129.  See 40 C.F.R. § 122.44(d)(1)(i) (2015). 
130.  Rena Steinzor et al., Accountability: Water Quality Trading in the 
Chesapeake Bay 12 (Ctr. for Progressive Reform, Briefing Paper No. 1205, May 
2012), http://www.progressivereform.org/articles/WQT_1205.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/XMW5-WBJT] (finding that two of the seven Chesapeake Bay 
states have some numeric nutrient criteria though the majority continue to use 
narrative criteria). 
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With set numeric criteria for nutrients, the state can 
more easily prioritize a list of nutrient-impaired waters as 
required by the CWA.131  TMDLs should be developed in 
those watersheds eager to trade.  Data from the TMDL 
can then be used to set the NPDES permit limits, which 
will be used as the pollution caps that drive trading.132  
Most existing trading programs use pollution caps 
established under a TMDL to drive demand for credits.133 
Although EPA supports pre-TMDL trading, if the 
watershed fails to attain the water quality standard through 
offsets or trading, then a TMDL will be established.  This 
will result in a new trading baseline.134  In the case of 
nonpoint sources seeking to generate tradable credits 
from their BMPs, the nonpoint source must first comply 
with all regulatory management requirements, thereby 
meeting the baseline.135  However, if a TMDL must be 
established, then the load allocations among nonpoint 
sources and point sources will be set, and “the reductions 
made to generate credits for pre-TMDL trading may no 
longer be adequate to generate credits under the 
TMDL.”136  This new baseline may be problematic for the 
present market participants.137  Trading under a TMDL 
provides the greatest certainty for market participants, but 
pre-TMDL trading could be used to “bridge[] the time from 
 
131.  See 33 U.S.C. § 1313(d)(1)(A), (C) (2012). 
132.  See WATER QUALITY TRADING POLICY, supra note 11, at 4-6; see also 
Am. Farm Bureau Fed’n v. EPA, 792 F.3d 281, 289 (3d Cir. 2015) (recognizing the 
“pollution caps” established by CWA’s TMDL and permit requirements). 
133. See WATER QUALITY TRADING TOOLKIT, supra note 19, at 8.  
134. See WATER QUALITY TRADING POLICY, supra note 11, at 5 (finding 
trading baseline is the regulatory requirement that must be met before any 
additional nutrient discharge reductions will be available as tradable credits). 
135.  See EPA, WATER QUALITY TRADING SCENARIO: NONPOINT SOURCE 
CREDIT EXCHANGE 33, https://www3.epa.gov/npdes/pubs/wqtradingtoolkit_nps-
credit-exchange.pdf [https://perma.cc/ED5S-4PKU]. 
136.  See WATER QUALITY TRADING POLICY, supra note 11, at 5.  
137.  See id. (providing that a TDML will be set if pre-TDML does not achieve 
required water quality standards, but the reductions made for the pre-TMDL may 
not be adequate under the newly developed TMDL); Alexandra Dapolito Dunn, 
Water Quality Trading: Bringing Market Forces to Bear in Watersheds, 17 NAT. 
RESOURCES & ENV’T. 137, 138 (2002).  
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when a water is listed as nutrient impaired to the time the 
TMDL is complete.”138 
The details of Arkansas’s nutrient water quality 
trading program could be included in the TMDL or NPDES 
permit on a case-by-case basis in conjunction with a 
Watershed Implementation Plan (WIP).139  For instance, 
the Chesapeake Bay TMDL acknowledges state plans to 
comply with the TMDL cap and allow for population and 
industry growth by using offsets from non-point sources.140  
EPA has supported water quality trading programs in the 
Chesapeake Bay “as long as they are established and 
implemented in a manner consistent with the CWA, its 
implementing regulations, and EPA’s 2003 Water Quality 
Trading Policy141 and 2007 Water Quality Trading Toolkit 
for NPDES Permit Writers.”142  Acknowledging the 
approved trading guidelines in a TMDL is more efficient 
than relying on the permit writer to analyze the validity of 
trades on an individual basis.  The Chesapeake Bay 
TMDL goes on to expressly prohibit trading that would 
“cause or contribute to an exceedance of [Water Quality 
Standards] in either receiving segments or anywhere else 
in the Bay watershed,” or “that would delay or weaken 
implementation of the Bay TMDL, that is inconsistent with 
the assumptions and requirements of the TMDL, or that 
would cause the combined point source and nonpoint 
source loadings covered by a trade to exceed the 
applicable loading cap established by the TMDL.”143 
C. Prohibit Trading that Results in Impairment 
 
138.  MINN. POLLUTION CONTROL AGENCY, PRE-TOTAL MAXIMUM DAILY LOAD 
PHOSPHOROUS TRADING PERMITTING STRATEGY 1 (2008), 
http://www.pca.state.mn.us/index.php/view-document.html?gid=10762 
[https://perma.cc/LEU3-64FN]; WATER QUALITY TRADING POLICY, supra note 11, at 
7. 
139.  See WATER QUALITY TRADING POLICY, supra note 11, at 7. 
140.  See EPA, CHESAPEAKE BAY TMDL 10-1 (2010), 
http://www2.epa.gov/sites/production/files/2014-
12/documents/cbay_final_tmdl_section_10_final_0.pdf [https://perma.cc/S6ZG-
29R9]. 
141.   Id. at 10-3. 
142.  Id. 
143.  Id.  
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The most common argument against trading is that it 
will result in “hotspots.”144  In the water quality context, a 
“hotspot” is a waterbody segment with “locally high 
loadings of pollutants.”145  High levels of nutrient pollution 
can cause increased algal blooms, which impact the 
aesthetic value of the lake or stream, can cause fish kills, 
or even result in toxic drinking water.146  EPA’s Trading 
Policy expressly prohibits trades that are likely to result in 
hotspots.147  The concern stems from the fact that trading 
may allow point sources to continue discharging pollutants 
at their current level or increase their discharge, which 
might create hotspots of nutrient pollution because the 
pollution reduction was made somewhere else in the 
watershed.148  Allowing point sources to trade nutrient 
reductions with any nonpoint source in the watershed 
could result in the nonpoint source BMPs mostly being 
located downstream from the point sources.  The higher 
water quality below the BMPs would then dilute the waste 
load from the point sources enough to comply with the 
TMDL.149  However, the segments between the point 
sources and the nonpoint source BMPs could create 
hotspots that impair the water’s designated use (e.g., 
drinking, fishing, and swimming).150 
 
144.  See Sean Blacklocke & Ben Dziegielewski, The U.S. Environmental 
Protection Agency’s Water Quality Trading Policy: New Opportunities for 
Environmental Advocacy Groups?, 3 AWRA HYDROLOGY & WATERSHED MGMT. 
TECHNICAL COMMITTEE 1, 8, 9 (2005), 
http://www.awra.org/committees/techcom/watershed/pdfs/0301WU.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/QTZ6-V683]. 
145.  See WATER QUALITY TRADING ASSESSMENT HANDBOOK, supra note 24, 
at 6.  
146.  See Jeff Stone, Health Advisories Issued for Cyanotoxins, 28 ARK. 
DRINKING WATER UPDATE 3, 3 (2015), 
http://www.healthy.arkansas.gov/programsServices/environmentalHealth/Engineeri
ng/drinkingWater/Documents/Publications/Newsletters/Summer2015.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/S2QJ-EQFL]; see also Nutrient Pollution: Harmful Algal Blooms, 
EPA, https://www.epa.gov/nutrientpollution/harmful-algal-blooms 
[https://perma.cc/CE2S-C84D]. 
147.  See WATER QUALITY TRADING POLICY, supra note 11, at 4, 7. 
148.  See WATER QUALITY TRADING ASSESSMENT HANDBOOK, supra note 24, 
at 17.  
149.  See id. at 17. 
150.  See id. at 15-16 (stating that a hotspot is a waterbody segment with 
“locally high loadings of pollutants and illustrating that longer segments between 
sources accumulate more pollutants); see also Stone, supra note 143 (explaining 
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Because permit compliance is measured only at the 
point source, nutrient reductions from trading should occur 
upstream from the permitted point source in order to avoid 
hotspots.151  EPA acknowledged the potential hotspot 
issue in its Water Quality Trading Policy, stating that “EPA 
does not support any use of credits or trading activity that 
would cause an impairment of existing or designated uses, 
adversely affect water quality at an intake for drinking 
water supply or that would exceed a cap established 
under a TMDL.”152  More recently, Region 3 of the EPA 
addressed this concern by concluding “the generator of 
the credit should be upstream of the buyer or user of the 
credit, as a way to minimize the risk of water quality 
impairment in the water between the two sources.”153 
If data shows that point sources are creating hotspots 
caused by their downstream trading activity, it may result 
in costly litigation.154  Trading programs should avoid this 
litigation risk by limiting point sources to trading with 
upstream sources.  This limitation may significantly reduce 
the number of potential market participants155 but will 
ensure compliance with the law. 
D. Requirements for Sources Seeking to Generate 
Credits 
1. The Role of Baselines 
The baseline is the regulatory minimum that potential 
market participants—point source or nonpoint source—
must meet before being eligible to generate credits.156  
 
that high concentrations of cyanotoxins would make water toxic and unsafe to 
drink). 
151.  See id. at 15-16.  
152.  See WATER QUALITY TRADING POLICY, supra note 11, at 7. 
153.  EPA REGION III, LOCAL WATER QUALITY PROTECTION WHEN USING 
CREDITS FOR NPDES PERMIT ISSUANCE AND COMPLIANCE, supra note 124, at 7. 
154.  Corrigan, supra note 104, at 18 (finding “hotspots” to be among several 
potential weaknesses in state trading programs which may be ripe for litigation); 
see, e.g., Food & Water Watch v. EPA, 5 F. Supp. 3d 62, 73 (D.D.C. 2013). 
155.  See, e.g., GEOSYNTEC CONSULTANTS, NUTRIENT TRADING IN MISSOURI: 
CRITICAL POLICY FACTORS AND PROGRAM RECOMMENDATIONS 8, 33-35 (2013), 
http://www.mocorn.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/09/CIG_Nutrient-Trading-in-
Missouri_Feb2013.pdf [https://perma.cc/X24A-JWHC]. 
156.  See WATER QUALITY TRADING POLICY, supra note 11, at 4-5. 
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Only nutrient reductions in excess of the established 
baseline will be available for trading.157  Every unit of 
phosphorous the point source eliminates beyond its 
Technology Based Effluent Limitation or Water Quality 
Based Effluent Limitation will generate a water quality 
credit.  Similarly, every unit of phosphorous or nitrogen 
removed from a nonpoint source beyond the state’s 
regulatory requirements will be eligible for a water quality 
credit.  Because nonpoint sources are not subject to 
NPDES permits and state regulatory requirements on 
nonpoint sources are limited, the potential supply of 
credits from nonpoint sources is greater than that available 
from most point sources.158 
Arguably, the opportunities created by trading are 
inconsistent with the CWA goal that “best” technology 
requirements will incentivize advances in technology to the 
point of zero discharges.159  The problem with this goal is 
that it only incentivizes advances in pollution reduction 
technologies for point sources, which are not the primary 
sources of nutrient pollution.  While trading could create a 
disincentive to “best” technology advancements for 
existing point sources, it will, on the other hand, create 
incentives for technological advances for nonpoint 
sources.160  Then again, the opportunity for point-to-point 
trading may also increase the incentive among point 
sources to invest in advanced treatment technology. 
2. Point Source Generated Credits 
Point source credits may be generated through over-
control.161  Typically, new facilities entering the watershed 
are able to incorporate the most advanced technology, 
which allows them to discharge nutrients below their 
permit limit.162  Any facility that maintains their nutrient 
 
157.  See id. at 5. 
158.  See WATER QUALITY TRADING TOOLKIT, supra note 19, at 1; See WATER 
QUALITY TRADING ASSESSMENT HANDBOOK, supra note 24, at 9-10 (Figure 2.2). 
159.  33 U.S.C. § 1311(b) (2012). 
160.  See WATER QUALITY TRADING TOOLKIT, supra note 19, at 1.  
161. See WATER QUALITY TRADING ASSESSMENT HANDBOOK, supra note 24, 
at 22.  
162.  See WATER QUALITY TRADING TOOLKIT, supra note 19, at 15.  
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discharge below their permit limit may trade the surplus 
with facilities that exceed their permit limit.163  The point 
source to point source trade is the most “straightforward, 
easily measurable, and directly enforceable” option 
available under a trading program.164  The point source 
seller will enter into a contractual trade agreement with 
another point source buyer in the same watershed.165  
This agreement will then be incorporated into each 
facility’s NPDES permit.166  The point source to point 
source trade can also be transmitted through a point 
source credit exchange where multiple point sources in a 
watershed can buy or sell credits as needed.167  These 
exchanges hold credits no longer than the reconciliation 
period corresponding with the effluent type.168  When 
available, point source to point source trading can be an 
economically efficient option with little uncertainty.169  
However, credits from point source over-control are rarely 
available and far more expensive than nonpoint source 
credits due to the high cost of technologies capable of 
removing ever-smaller amounts of phosphorous or 
nitrogen. 
3. Nonpoint Source Generated Credits 
Alternatively, nonpoint source to point source trades 
can be a cost-effective means of achieving the same or 
greater nutrient reductions required to meet the point 
source’s permit limit.170  The difficulty in trading with 
nonpoint sources is that they are not as straightforward or 
easily quantified.  This is where the state’s regulatory 
framework should provide clear requirements for nonpoint 
sources generating credits, which would not otherwise 
 
163.  See WATER QUALITY TRADING ASSESSMENT HANDBOOK, supra note 24, 
at 22.  
164.  See WATER QUALITY TRADING TOOLKIT, supra note 19, at 15.  
165.  Id. 
166.  Id. 
167.  Id. at 16-17. 
168.  Id. at 34-37.  Reconciliation periods can be thought of as the shelf life or 
expiration date of any given nutrient reduction credit.  Id.  The length of the 
reconciliation period will depend on the type of pollutant being traded.  Id. 
169.  See WATER QUALITY TRADING TOOLKIT, supra note 19, at 15.  
170.  See id. at 17-18. 
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occur.  By establishing a framework that addresses the 
concerns around monitoring, the uncertainty of pollutant 
reductions, and the timing of BMP-generated nonpoint 
source credits, the regulations can ensure both legal 
compliance and consistency among trading programs 
across the state. 
4. Quantification and Monitoring 
The choice of monitoring method is an important 
scientific and policy determination that needs to be 
addressed in statewide guidance or regulation.  As with 
each of these important decisions, consideration must be 
given to more than economic efficiency and political 
expediency in order to gain EPA approval and avoid costly 
litigation.  Monitoring is a federal requirement for point 
source permit compliance and must also be addressed 
when generating water quality credits from nonpoint 
sources that benefit the regulated point source.171  
Fortunately, Arkansas has a relatively advanced network 
of water quality monitoring stations currently in place172 
and the University of Arkansas employs some of the top 
scientists in the field.173 
Establishing an equivalency between the quantity of 
nutrients reduced by point source dischargers and edge-
of-field reductions from nonpoint sources is not exact.  
Nonpoint source reductions can be quantified using three 
techniques: (1) modeling; (2) pre-determined BMP 
efficiencies; or (3) direct monitoring.174  Pre-determined 
BMP efficiencies based on best available scientific data 
are a practical starting point for nonpoint source trading, 
 
171.  See, e.g., N.Y. STATE DEP’T OF ENVTL. CONSERVATION, FINAL PHASE I: 
NUTRIENT AND SEDIMENT WATER QUALITY IMPROVEMENT AND PROTECTION PLAN 120 
(2010), http://www.dec.ny.gov/docs/water_pdf/finalphaseiwip.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/H649-TSLB]. 
172.  See ARK. DEP’T ENVTL. QUALITY, INTEGRATED WATER QUALITY 
MONITORING ASSESSMENT REPORT, supra note 124, at III-1. 
173.  See, e.g., UNIV. OF ARK. DIV. OF AGRIC.: PUB. POLICY CTR., THE ROLE OF 
NONPOINT SOURCE MODELS IN WATERSHED MANAGEMENT, supra note 110, at 4. 
174.  See, e.g., WILLAMETTE P’SHIP, IN IT TOGETHER: A HOW-TO REFERENCE 
FOR BUILDING POINT-NONPOINT WATER QUALITY TRADING PROGRAMS: DESIGNING 
AND OPERATING A TRADING PROGRAM (PART 2 OF 3) 20-21 (2012), 
http://willamettepartnership.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/09/In-It-Together-Part-
2_2012-07-30.pdf [https://perma.cc/W9EN-YP52]. 
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but greater accuracy comes from site-specific monitoring, 
which can be developed over time.175  Modeling can be an 
effective method of tracking nutrient load reductions from 
nonpoint sources, and with the advancements in 
technology modeling is becoming the preferred method of 
monitoring.176  Direct monitoring, while the most accurate 
method, is also the most costly, and thus less often used 
in trading programs.177 
5. Uncertainty Ratios 
After using the best scientific data available to 
quantify the nutrient reduction from a given BMP, any 
remaining uncertainty can be accounted for using an 
uncertainty ratio.  These ratios are commonly used in 
established trading programs and are encouraged as a 
means for ensuring effective pollutant reductions by both 
EPA and USDA.178  Unfortunately, as with limiting the 
generation of credits to upstream sources, uncertainty 
ratios will further increase the cost of credits generated 
from nonpoint sources.179  However, using a conservative 
2:1 or 3:1 uncertainty ratio can still be a cost effective 
option.  In fact, trading could remain cost effective with a 
10:1 ratio in some instances.180  Fortunately, decades of 
research provide adequate certainty that BMPs generating 
water quality credits can be accurately valued using a 
smaller than 10:1 uncertainty ratio.181  As methods of 
quantifying BMP nutrient load reductions continue to 
 
175.  Id. at 21. 
176.  Id. at 20.  
177.  Id. at 21. 
178.  See WATER QUALITY TRADING ASSESSMENT HANDBOOK, supra note 24, 
at 16.  
179.  See, e.g., GEOSYNTEC CONSULTANTS, NUTRIENT TRADING IN MISSOURI: 
CRITICAL POLICY FACTORS AND PROGRAM RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note 152, at 
7-8, 33-35. 
180.  See supra note 106. 
181.  See, e.g., IOWA STATE UNIV. SCI. TEAM, IOWA NUTRIENT REDUCTION 
STRATEGY, supra note 109, at 5 (“[T]he [phosphorus] management strategies of 
cover crops (50% reduction) and conversion of all tillage to no-till (39% reduction) 
have the potential to substantially reduce [phosphorus] loss.  Converting all acres 
of intensive tillage (<20% residue) to conservation tillage (>30% residue) would 
potentially reduce [phosphorus] loss by 11%.  Injecting or banding of [phosphorus] 
within current no-till acres has little potential impact on [phosphorus] loss (<1%).”). 
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improve, the value and supply of potential nonpoint source 
credits will increase.  Nonpoint to point trading programs 
will further incentivize these improvements by creating a 
market for more accurate data. 
6. Timing 
The timing of trades is another foundational issue that 
should be addressed in the state’s framework.  Concerns 
around timing focus on the point at which credits 
generated by nonpoint sources may be used by the point 
source to meet their permit requirements.182  For instance, 
anticipated credits generated by a nonpoint source partner 
will not be available until the BMP has been implemented 
and verified.  Once verified, the credits generated may 
only be used during the same compliance period.  So, if 
the point source compliance period for phosphorous is one 
month, then a point source can purchase credits from 
nonpoint sources that are generated during that month.  
Permitting guidance provides for longer averaging periods, 
such as an annual rather than monthly average, to 
address seasonality concerns associated with nonpoint 
source trading.183  This allowance can be made if the 
permit writer determines that “monthly average, weekly 
average, or maximum daily limitations” are “impracticable” 
when calculating nutrient reduction averaging periods.184  
If, however, Arkansas’s trading framework favors 
economic efficiency over compliance with the CWA’s 
mandates, EPA could expand its oversight of the 
Arkansas Department of Environmental Quality’s (ADEQ) 
issuance of NPDES permits as it did after Act 964 was 
passed in 2013.185 
D. Water Quality Management Plan and Watershed 
Implementation Plans 
 
182.  See WATER QUALITY TRADING TOOLKIT, supra note 19, at 35. 
183.  Id.  
184.  Id. at 37. 
185.  Letter from William K. Honker, Water Quality Prot. Div. Director, to Ryan 
Benefield, Ark. Dept. of Envtl. Quality Deputy Dir. (Aug. 28, 2013) (on file with 
author). 
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Arkansas’s regulatory framework will provide broad 
program guidance, but the CWA requires states to 
implement water quality management plans at the local 
level.186  These management plans may provide a useful 
platform for integrating water quality trading programs at 
the local level. 
Watershed Implementation Plans (WIPs) have been 
developed by local and regional watershed 
organizations187 along with state governments across the 
nation as a framework for implementing programs to attain 
water quality standards.188  They are an outgrowth of the 
CWA’s requirement that states develop ongoing water 
quality management plans.189  In its Final Water Quality 
Trading Policy, EPA acknowledged the importance of 
using WIPs developed from the state’s Water Quality 
Management Plan when developing a trading program.190  
WIPs should build off the state’s statutory or regulatory 
framework.  The most advanced implementation plans 
have been developed and approved by EPA in the states 
under the Chesapeake Bay TMDL.191  Not all state WIPs 
are as stringent as those developed by the Bay states, but 
each should contain nine key elements:  (1) identify 
causes and sources of pollution, (2) determine load 
reductions needed, (3) develop management measures, 
(4) identify technical and financial assistance needed, (5) 
develop information/education component, (6) develop 
implementation schedule, (7) develop interim milestones 
 
186.  See 40 C.F.R. § 130.6(c)(3) (2006). 
187.  See, e.g., Chesapeake Bay Watershed Implementation Plans (WIPs), 
EPA, https://www.epa.gov/chesapeake-bay-tmdl/chesapeake-bay-watershed-
implementation-plans-wips [https://perma.cc/4EWB-XLG9]. 
188.  See, e.g., Watershed Implementation Plans (WIPs), MO. DEP’T OF 
ENVTL. QUALITY, 
https://www.deq.state.ms.us/mdeq.nsf/page/WMB_WIPs?OpenDocument 
[https://perma.cc/AS87-CQVB]; Implementing Maryland’s Action Plan: Building 
Local Partnerships to Meet Bay Restoration Goals, MD. DEP’T OF THE ENV’T, 
http://www.mde.state.md.us/programs/Water/TMDL/TMDLImplementation/Pages/
WIP_Implementation.aspx [https://perma.cc/43M2-HB4C]. 
189.  33 U.S.C. § 1313(d)-(e) (2012). 
190.  See WATER QUALITY TRADING POLICY, supra note 11, at 6; see also 33 
U.S.C. § 1313(d)-(e) (discussing water quality standards and implementation 
plans); 40 C.F.R. § 130.6 (2015) (discussing Water Quality Management Plans). 
191.  See Chesapeake Bay Watershed Implementation Plans (WIPs), supra 
note 184. 
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to track implementation, (8) develop criteria to measure 
progress toward meeting watershed goals, and (9) 
develop monitoring component.192  WIPs must ultimately 
receive approval from the Regional EPA office.193 
E. Memorandum of Understanding 
The successful implementation of these plans first 
requires buy-in from multiple state agencies, which can be 
achieved through a Memorandum of Understanding 
(MOU).194  The MOU defines the roles and responsibilities 
of each agency based on the mutual goal of attaining 
water quality standards in the watershed.195  Depending 
on the watershed boundaries, the MOU may require 
interstate agency collaboration.196  Once the state has 
established the roles and responsibilities of the various 
agencies, the focus can turn to establishing baselines, 
what can be traded, credit values for particular BMPs, 
credit terms, and other important details specific to the 
particular watershed implementation plan. 
IV.  CONCLUSION 
Arkansas has taken an important first step toward 
reducing nutrient pollution from nonpoint sources across 
the state by passing Act 335 to allow trading.  The 
framework that is being developed now will determine 
whether trading provides economic and environmental 
benefits to local communities or leads to costly litigation 
 
192.  See EPA, A QUICK GUIDE TO DEVELOPING WATERSHED PLANS TO 
RESTORE AND PROTECT OUR WATERS 3 (2013), 
https://www.epa.gov/sites/production/files/2015-
12/documents/watershed_mgmnt_quick_guide.pdf [https://perma.cc/3EV8-YXTV]; 
NONPOINT SOURCE POLLUTION MANAGEMENT PLAN, supra note 1, at 11-19; 
Watershed Implementation Plans (WIPs), supra note 185. 
193.  Polluted Runoff: Nonpoint Source Pollution: 319 Grant: Current 
Guidance, EPA, https://www.epa.gov/polluted-runoff-nonpoint-source-
pollution/319-grant-current-guidance [https://perma.cc/VU5S-KMBY]. 
194.  See N.Y. STATE DEP’T OF ENVTL. CONSERVATION, FINAL PHASE II: 
WATERSHED IMPLEMENTATION PLAN 31-32 (2013), 
http://www.dec.ny.gov/docs/water_pdf/finalphaseiiwip.pdf [https://perma.cc/MH4P-
V6MJ].  
195.  See id.  
196.  See id. 
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while the damages of nonpoint source pollution continue 
to grow. 
Nutrient water quality trading can work.  Once the 
framework is in place, small-scale, pilot programs would 
be a good first step.  The patience, diligence, and 
creativity of all participants will be essential to the long-
term success of this new approach to pollution reduction.  
The environmental impacts and economic costs 
associated with reducing nutrient loads from point sources 
alone is well documented.  Our current regulatory scheme 
has failed to prevent some lakes and streams from 
becoming unfit for fishing or swimming, and it is becoming 
increasingly costly to treat for drinking water.  Once the 
regulatory framework is in place, Arkansas’s nutrient water 
quality trading program could provide a market-based 
solution that moves The Natural State toward cleaner 
lakes and streams while making progress towards the 
primary objective of the CWA:  eliminating water pollution 
from all sources. 
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